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INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) is a uniform law that
serves as a guide for states to use when drafting their own respective
1
trade secret legislation. Because the UTSA is merely a guide, even
after its enactment, state legislatures were, and still are, free to choose
2
which sections of the UTSA to adopt within their respective states. As
a result, some states have adopted the UTSA as written, while others
have made alterations by leaving some sections out. In general, seven
states adopted the original 1979 version of the UTSA immediately upon
enactment, and thirty-nine states and the U.S. Virgin Islands adopted
3
the UTSA with the 1985 amendments. Additionally, both the New
York and New Jersey legislatures are considering whether to adopt
4
pending versions of the UTSA. In general, the UTSA has been widely
adopted.
In spite of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws’ (“NCCUSL”) best attempt to (1) promote even
development of trade secret law, and (2) relieve the uncertainty
surrounding trade secret protection, ambiguity and uncertainty persist
within trade secret law. More specifically, judicial disputes regarding
what exactly constitutes a trade secret and how to protect confidential
information that does not quite rise to the level of a trade secret have
5
arisen within the context of employer-employee relationships. Several
courts throughout the country have held that the UTSA does not
abrogate all other civil remedies based on the misappropriation of
confidential information if a court deems that the information is not a
6
trade secret. In other words, some courts have held that an employer
1. See 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 3 (2006).
2. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Trade Secrets - The New Risks to Trade Secrets
Posed by Computerization, 28 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 227, 233 (2002); Breana C.
Smith et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 663, 671 (2006).
3. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the . . . Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited
Jan. 11, 2008).
4. A.B. 2296, 229th Legis., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); A.B. 2352, 212th Legis., 1st Sess.
(N.J. 2006).
5. See, e.g., Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2006).
6. See, Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 792-93; Combined Metals of Chicago Ltd. P'ship v.
Airtek, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 827, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (to the extent to which materials did not
constitute a trade secret, plaintiff could continue a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., Inc.
v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d 652, 658-59 (E.D. Va. 2002) (alternate
claims, not based on trade secret information could proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F.
Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (only those claims that rely entirely on a trade secret
should be abrogated).
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may only bring a claim under the UTSA for the misappropriation of
information legally defined as a trade secret. As a result of this
interpretation of the UTSA, businesses are free to bring a variety of
other civil tort claims for the misappropriation of information that falls
just short of trade secret status. Other courts, however, have held that
the UTSA does abrogate other civil tort remedies based on the misuse
7
of confidential information deemed not to be a trade secret. As a result
of these conflicting judicial opinions, the type of information that
departing employees are free to use is unclear. Consequently, the result
of these conflicting interpretations of the UTSA may have a detrimental
effect on employees, employers, and even competing businesses.
In general, then, courts and legislatures need to determine whether
the UTSA should allow, under its umbrella, “a claim that a defendant
8
has misused commercial information that is not a trade secret.” This
question may seem to be of little consequence in practice; however, as
Attorney Tait Graves points out in his analysis of California trade secret
and tort law, there are significant public policy implications resulting
9
from this interpretation of the UTSA. If the UTSA abrogates other
tort claims for the misappropriation of information deemed not to be a
trade secret, employees will be afforded much greater protection
because claims for such misappropriation would be limited to only those
10
This interpretation of the UTSA
claims allowed under the UTSA.
would also further the overall public policy supporting a mobile
workforce by preventing departing employees from being overly
concerned about using marginally confidential information or
11
information deemed to be general knowledge.
In general, “the degree to which individuals and [competing]
businesses . . . are free to use information that does not qualify as a
12
trade secret” should be scrutinized to eliminate the ambiguity that
currently exists. In the future, courts should seek to create a “beneficial
balance between innovation and competition” by affording protection
to confidential information held to be of significant value to companies

7. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 792-93 (recognizing that courts from other jurisdictions
have abrogated all claims for the misappropriation of confidential information).
8. See Tait Graves, Nonpublic Information and California Tort Law: A Proposal for
Harmonizing California’s Employee Mobility and Intellectual Property Regimes Under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 1 (2006).
9. Id. ¶ 2.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Id.
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and businesses, even if the information does not rise to the level of a
13
trade secret. The law in this area should work towards “minimiz[ing]
the incentives to obtain competitively valuable information through
14
corrupt practices, rather than through independent effort.”
Thus, in general, this Comment will examine which interpretation of
the UTSA, as interpreted and adopted by the states, is more consistent
with the public policy underlying the UTSA. Part I discusses the history
and development of trade secret law to depict how the law developed as
it exists today. Next, Part II explains how different courts have
interpreted the UTSA’s abrogation clause in fact patterns involving
three different types of confidential information. Part III explains the
competing interests that underlie the public policy supporting trade
secret law and the protection of confidential information. Finally, Part
IV discusses the policy reasons behind protecting information that is
confidential, but does not rise to the level of a trade secret, and goes on
to discuss which interpretation of the UTSA best comports with the
public policy of the UTSA and the interests of businesses and
employees.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE SECRET LAW
A. Sources of Trade Secret Law
“American courts have granted protection for trade secrets against
15
their misuse or unauthorized disclosure for over one-hundred years.”
For decades, scholars have known that protecting trade secrets is
important in order for businesses to remain “technologically
16
In spite of the murky common law and statutory
competitive.”
remedies for trade secret misappropriation, industries continue to rely
17
on trade secret protection. In the late 1960s, the Patent Law Section of
the American Bar Association discussed a resolution favoring the

13. Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential
Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 850-52
(1998). Because the exchange of information is such an important component in the process
of improving upon current technology and innovation, precluding the unauthorized transfer
of all useful data and knowledge would prevent innovation from occurring. Id. at 849-50
(emphasis added).
14. Id. at 846.
15. 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 1 (footnotes omitted).
16. Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L.
REV. 378, 378 (1971).
17. See id. at 380-81.
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enactment of a uniform state law that protected against the
18
misappropriation of trade secrets or other confidential information.
As a result, the NCCUSL drafted the UTSA, which was finally adopted
19
in 1979. The drafters at the NCCUSL were motivated to draft the
UTSA for a number of reasons. First, the drafters understood how
important trade secret law was in promoting and maintaining interstate
20
business. Second, the drafters realized that trade secret law had not
21
“developed satisfactorily.” The drafters noted that trade secret law
had developed unevenly and, as a result, there was “undue uncertainty
22
concerning the parameters of trade secret protection.”
The NCCUSL also recognized, when drafting the UTSA, that “[i]n
view of the substantial number of patents that are invalidated by the
courts, many businesses now elect to protect commercially valuable
23
information . . . [via] the state law of trade secret protection.”
Furthermore, trade secret protection is more important now because
there has been “unprecedented . . . growth in the computer, biotechnical
24
and communications industries.”
Early trade secret law initially developed from the common law;
and, today, the law of trade secrets has further developed from both the
Restatement of Torts as well as from Congress’ enactment of the
25
UTSA. The Restatement describes a trade secret as “any formula,
pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used in one’s
business, and which gives [the holder] an opportunity to obtain an
26
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” In previous
cases, courts have protected a variety of information, including
“nontechnological business information,” which is likely at issue in the
27
majority of cases between employers and former employees.

18. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT Prefatory Note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 531-32
(1979).
19. See id. at 532.
20. See id. at 530-31.
21. Id. at 531.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 530. The Commission determined this based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), which held “neither the
Patent Clause of the United States Constitution nor the federal patent laws pre-empt state
trade secret protection for patentable or unpatentable information.” Id.
24. 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 1.
25. Id. at 619, § 4.
26. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
27. 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 6 (2006).
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Next, according to the Restatement, the information must be secret
28
and cannot be a matter of general knowledge. Any information must
29
also be somewhat novel. Finally, information deemed to be a trade
secret must be “used for business purposes and must provide a
competitive advantage to the owner of the trade secret. Thus, it must be
30
Under the Restatement, trade secret
of value to the holder.”
infringement occurs when one not normally privy to the trade secret
31
improperly takes and discloses it.
After the 1985 amendments to the UTSA, the UTSA defined a trade
secret as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
32
program, device, method, technique, or process.” That “information”
must “derive[] independent economic value . . . from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
33
and is the subject of efforts that . . . maintain its secrecy.” State trade
secret statutes, as adopted from the UTSA, typically follow the UTSA
by defining what a trade secret is and what constitutes
34
In addition, these statues describe the damages
misappropriation.
allowed for misappropriation and that employers must take reasonable
35
Finally, the statute
steps to protect their company’s trade secrets.
36
describes its effect on other laws.
The UTSA “creates a claim for
37
damages and injunctive relief for misappropriation of trade secrets.”
The statutes also focus on criminal sanctions and all states have criminal
38
penalties for the misappropriation of trade secrets. However, in spite
of such attempts to codify and clarify the law of trade secrets, much
39
confusion still exists.

28. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
29. 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 6 (2006). This could also include information
or any idea not generally known in the trade secret owner’s trade or business.
30. Id. (footnotes omitted).
31. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). Liability for infringement of
information deemed to be a trade secret is not determined merely by using or copying the
information. Instead, the use of “improper means” to obtain the trade secret is the basis of
liability under the Restatement. See id.
32. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (1979).
33. Id. § 1(4).
34. See e.g., WIS. STAT. § 134.90(1)(c), (2) (2003-04).
35. See id. § 134.90(1)(c), (2), (4).
36. See id. § 134.90(6).
37. Smith et al., supra note 2, at 671.
38. Id. at 665.
39. See Michael L. Rustad, Symposium Review: The Negligent Enablement of Trade
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B. Classification of Confidential Information
To be afforded trade secret protection, the information at issue
must satisfy the definition set forth by the UTSA. Though the
definition is somewhat broad, it is often applied rigidly, leaving some
40
valuable confidential information unprotected.
Though an exact
41
definition of a trade secret is somewhat elusive, trade secret scholars
have accepted the fact that there is some information that should be
42
protected that does not rise to the level of a trade secret. Further, the
UTSA does not explicitly provide alternative remedies for those
borderline pieces of information not classified as trade secrets, but that
exist as confidential business or industry information not readily known
to all. However, section seven of the UTSA also does not explicitly
abrogate claims for misappropriation of information deemed not to be a
43
Therefore, section seven merely creates confusion
trade secret.
regarding the available claims for misappropriation of all other
confidential information that does not rise to the level of a trade secret.
Before the introduction of the UTSA, the common law defined a
trade secret as “an idea not generally known and treated by the owner
44
as a secret.” Today, however, a variety of factors contribute to the
uncertainty surrounding what rises to the level of a trade secret and
what merely constitutes confidential information. Legal scholars and
practitioners alike have attempted to define what constitutes
confidential information and the level, if any, of protection of that
45
Robert Unikel, a trade secret practitioner, suggested
information.
adopting Robert Milgrim’s hierarchical approach to defining trade
46
secrets.
This approach involves “classify[ing] the various types of

Secret Misappropriation, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 455, 516-17
(2006).
40. For the definition of a trade secret under the UTSA, see supra Part I.A.
41. See Rustad, supra note 39, at 506-07.
42. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 844 (explaining that there is confidential information
that does not technically rise to the level of a trade secret yet continues to be valuable within
an industry).
43. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (1979).
44. Comment, supra note 16, at 381.
45. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 868-75. After discussing throughout his article how
trade secret scholars, such as Robert Milgrim, have recommended that courts, legislator,
litigants, or whomever work to create a more useable method of protecting both trade secrets
and confidential information, the author concludes that law-making bodies must “recognize
and account for the existence of different types and levels of competitively significant
knowledge.” Id. at 890.
46. See id. at 844.
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technical data and business knowledge that companies and their
47
employees may possess.” According to this approach, there are three
hierarchical categories of business information:
1. information that is known to substantially all
persons in a particular field or industry . . . ;
2. information that is known to a majority, but
unknown to a minority, of persons in a particular
field or industry; and . . .
3. information that is known to a minority, but
unknown to the majority, of persons in a
48
particular field or industry.
Not all three categories should necessarily be afforded protection
under the UTSA or some other common law protection mechanism
because, for example, information readily known to a relative large
group of people already minimizes the incentives to obtain this
49
information in a corrupt manner. The first category of information,
information that is known to substantially all in a given field or industry,
50
should not receive any legal protection.
Because this category of
information is known, protecting this information would not serve the
court’s purpose of balancing innovation and competition. Further,
protecting this type of information would unnecessarily restrict an
employee’s mobility—that is, if an employee could not share this type of
information in his new job, he would be unduly restricted in those
51
positions he could accept.
The second category of information, information that is known to a
majority, but unknown to a minority of persons in a particular field or
47. Id.
48. Id. As made apparent from these categorical designations, the designations are not
necessarily based on the type of information at issue, but instead these categories are based
on the degree to which others in a particular field or industry know or are aware of the
information. Classifying information based on the particular nature of the information
would, I think, prove to ask too much of the courts. As technology expands and new forms of
information are developed, trying to define newly developed technology and information
would be too cumbersome and would lead to inconsistencies among the courts.
49. See id. at 850. For years, other tort claims were used to hold departing employees
responsible for misappropriation of confidential information not rising to the level of a trade
secret. See Graves, supra note 8, ¶¶ 45-46. Those claims include unfair competition, breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, and tortious interference, among others. Id. ¶¶ 47-52.
50. Unikel, supra note 13, at 850-51.
51. See id. at 850.
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industry, highlights the elusive problem that exists in trade secret law.
This type of information has an overall lower “competitive value” than
53
that information known to only a minority of people. As a result, this
54
type of information should be afforded only some legal protection.
Finally, the third category of information, which includes
information that is known to a minority, but unknown to the majority,
of persons in a particular field or industry, should receive the highest
55
level of legal protection. This type of information deserves the most
stringent level of protection because there is a great deal of motivation
for a competitor to use improper means to obtain this type of
information. Though this framework has not been incorporated into the
UTSA, it is likely the most effective approach for defining confidential
56
information that does not rise to the level of trade secret status. Also,
some information from categories two and three might, arguably, even
rise to the level of trade secret status. Therefore, this categorical
approach might prove to be a more effective and realistic method of
“defining” information that deserves protection.
II. HOW COURTS HAVE DETERMINED WHETHER THE UTSA
ABROGATES CLAIMS
Section seven of the UTSA states the UTSA’s effect on other law
with respect to information deemed to be a trade secret. The drafters
explicitly abrogate other civil remedies based on misappropriation of a
defined trade secret and, among the courts, there seems to be little
dispute that the UTSA did, in fact, intend to abrogate other civil
57
remedies when a claim involves misappropriation of trade secrets.
However, the language of the UTSA makes it less clear whether section

52. See id. at 852-54.
53. Id. at 852-53.
54. Id. at 853-54. Providing some level of legal protection for this type of information
works to protect, to a seemingly fair degree, information that is already known by some
competitors, but not others. Further, providing some protection for this type of information
would not too severely limit employee mobility, because departing employees would be able
to readily move among employers who already have possession of this type of information.
Therefore, these employees would only be restricted from working for and disclosing
information to those competitors who do not yet have this information. Id. at 853-54.
55. Id. at 851-52.
56. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 890. In his conclusion, the author argues that this
“layered approach to the problem of information protection” is the most effective method of
developing a satisfactorily “malleable, yet well-defined legal regime” that can provide the
stability that seems so necessary in this confusing area of law. Id.
57. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (1979).
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seven, and its state-adopted equivalents, abrogates other civil remedies
based upon the misappropriation of confidential information that does
58
not rise to the level of a trade secret. Sections 7(b)(1) and (2) state
that the UTSA does not affect: “(1) contractual remedies, whether or
not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or (2) other civil
remedies that are not based upon the misappropriation of a trade
59
secret.”
In spite of the NCCUSL’s best attempt to clarify the state of
trade secret law as it exists today, state courts across the country have
interpreted section seven’s declaration of the UTSA’s effect on other
60
laws in different ways. As a result, the question still exists as to how to
interpret the UTSA with respect to information that does not rise to the
level of a trade secret, but is still confidential information deemed
61
This type of information would
worthy of some legal protection.
include that information described in categories two and three in Part
62
II.
Currently, the reigning case law that interprets section seven of the
UTSA can be divided into three categories based on the legal claims
63
and type of information at issue: (1) “when the claims are based only
on the misuse of confidential information that satisfies the statutory
definition of a trade secret,” most courts agree that a claim under the
UTSA is the only tort claim available; (2) “when the claims are based on
the misuse of confidential information that does not meet the statutory
definition of a trade secret,” courts are divided on whether “the UTSA
abrogates those claims”; and (3) “when the claims are based on misuse
of confidential information, some of which meet the statutory definition
of a trade secret and some of which do not,” courts, again, are divided as
to whether the UTSA abrogates claims only to the extent that they are

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 792-93 (Wis.
2006).
61. See supra Part I.
62. See supra Part I.B.
63. See Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 792-93. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin provided a
particularly helpful analysis of the state of the law as it exists today. Though the court was
construing Wisconsin’s interpretation of the UTSA, it looked to other states’ decisions to
determine how best to interpret the Wisconsin statute, which was adopted from the UTSA
after the 1985 amendment. In addition to making uniform laws, the adoption of the UTSA
by the majority of states has made it easier for courts to turn to the case law in other
jurisdictions to help interpret a current legal claim falling either under or just outside the
scope of the UTSA. See id.
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based on a trade secret, and allows separate claims based on other
factual allegations such as the misappropriation of confidential
64
To fully understand the points of distinction between
information.
these three types of cases, examples of each category, each from a
different state, follow in the discussion below.
A. Category One Analysis
In the first category of cases, the plaintiffs base their claims “only
on the misuse of confidential information that fits the statutory
65
definition of a trade secret.” In these cases, most state courts agree
that a claim under the UTSA is the only tort claim available to the
66
plaintiffs. In other words, plaintiffs cannot bring claims such as unjust
67
enrichment or unfair competition when seeking relief. It is important
68
to note, however, that breach of contract claims may still survive.
One example of this type of case is R.K. Enterprise L.L.C. v. Pro69
Comp Management, Inc. where the Supreme Court of Arkansas
concluded that the information at issue in the case fell under the
70
statutory definition of a trade secret.
In the case, Pro-Comp
Management, among other affiliates, was doing business as The Right
71
TRS was a nurse-staffing service that provided
Solution (“TRS”).
72
travel nurses to facilities in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and adjacent states.
Katherine Hefley was the manager of one of TRS’s offices and Mary
73
Burks was an employee of TRS. Both Hefley and Burks resigned from
TRS and began working for R.K. Enterprise, a company that provided
74
travel nurses under the name of Nationwide Nurses (“Nationwide”).
A third employee, Traca Lane, fired by TRS, also began working for
75
Nationwide.

64. See id. at 792.
65. Id. at 792-93.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 793 n.10.
68. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(1) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (1979).
69. See generally R.K. Enterprise L.L.C. v. Pro-Comp Management, Inc., 158 S.W.3d
685 (Ark. 2004).
70. Id. at 688.
71. Id. at 686.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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While employed with TRS, Hefley, Burks, and Lane had access to
confidential information and each of them signed confidentiality and
76
non-compete agreements. Eventually, TRS determined that the three
former employees had removed original documents from employee
files, other files containing personal information about the employees
77
and tests that TRS used when hiring new nurses. Initially, TRS filed
theft of property claims under the criminal statutes, but it later
78
dismissed those charges.
Later, TRS amended its complaint against all three former
employees alleging “fraud, breach of non-competition and
confidentiality agreement, misappropriation of trade secrets in violation
79
of Arkansas Theft of Trade Secrets Act [(“Trade Secrets Act”)],
80
The trial court found that the
conversion, and civil conspiracy.”
former employees had misappropriated trade secrets in violation of the
Trade Secrets Act and required TRS to decide whether to seek recovery
under the Trade Secrets Act or to “seek recovery for the
misappropriation of trade secrets on the basis of tort claims of
81
conversion and conspiracy for misappropriation of trade secrets.”
Thus, before proceeding, the court in this case concluded that the
information at issue was, in fact, a trade secret; therefore, the
information should be afforded legal protection because it had
82
significant economic value to TRS.
Ultimately, TRS elected to recover damages under tort remedies
and the court awarded damages on the basis of conversion and
conspiracy of $262,303.00 based upon the market value of the trade
83
secrets.
However, on appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the
three former employees argued that the plain language of the Trade
84
Secrets Act abrogated all other tort remedies. In order to determine
whether the Trade Secret Act abrogated other tort remedies for

76. Id.
77. Id. at 687.
78. Id.
79. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (2001).
80. R.K. Enter., 158 S.W.3d at 687.
81. Id.
82. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 851. This type of information would likely fall under
the third category of information discussed in Part I.B above. Further, trade secret
information has competitive value and the court in this case seems to recognize the need to
aggressively protect that value. Id.
83. R.K. Enter., 158 S.W.3d at 687-88.
84. Id. at 688.
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misappropriation of trade secrets, the Arkansas Supreme Court used
85
rules of statutory construction to construe the meaning of the statute.
The court also examined cases from other jurisdictions with similar
86
statutory provisions. After its analysis, the court first determined that
“courts [must] examine whether the claim [at issue] is based upon the
87
misappropriation of a trade secret.” Because the court deemed the
information at issue a trade secret, the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act
88
applied in this case. Further, the court concluded that the “statutory
language of the Trade Secret Act . . . preempt[ed] [or abrogated] the
award of damages based upon tort claims for conversion of trade secrets
89
. . . that may arise under a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.”
Thus, the court in this case eliminated the tort claims available to
90
claimants for misappropriation of trade secrets. Ultimately, claimants
may only seek damages for the misappropriation of trade secrets under
91
the Trade Secrets Act in Arkansas. Courts in jurisdictions throughout
92
the country have come to a similar conclusion.
B. Category Two Analysis
The second category of cases highlights the true issue regarding
claims based on the misuse of confidential information that does not
meet the statutory definition of a trade secret, but that still derives
93
economic value from not being readily known. Some courts have held
that the UTSA does not abrogate civil remedies for claims regarding
confidential information that does not rise to the level of a trade secret,

85. Id. at 688-89.
86. Id. at 689.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 690.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See id. Many other jurisdictions have also held that a claim under a state’s
adoption of the UTSA is the only method of recovery allowed when seeking relief for
misappropriation of a trade secret. See Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717
N.W.2d 781, 792 n.10 (Wis. 2006).
92. Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 33, n.45. Similarly, these cases have found that the UTSA
abrogates other civil tort remedies, making the UTSA the only avenue of recovery for
claimants whose trade secrets have been misappropriated. Id. To hold otherwise would go
against the purpose of the UTSA, which was to simplify trade secret protection. UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT Prefatory Note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 531 (1979).
93. See supra Part I. This information includes both category two and category three
information as described above. However, the second category of information is more likely
at issue because, often times, category three information will rise to the level of trade secret
status. Therefore, it would be protected only by the UTSA.
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while others have held that the UTSA was intended to abrogate such
94
claims.
In the first example of this category of cases, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin overturned the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and held that the
UTSA does not abrogate all other civil remedies for the
misappropriation of confidential information deemed not to be a trade
95
secret. In Burbank Grease Services, L.L.C. v. Sokoloswski, the court
96
sought to determine whether Wisconsin’s adoption of the UTSA,
abrogates all civil law remedies based on the misappropriation of
confidential information that falls outside of the statutory definition of a
97
trade secret.
Burbank involved a company called Burbank Grease Services
(“Burbank”), which was in the “business of collecting and processing
98
used restaurant fry grease, trap grease, and industrial grease.” This
case arose after Larry Sokolowski (“Sokolowski”), one of Burbank’s
99
employees, resigned from his position as a territory manager. As a
territory manager, Sokolowski’s duties included overseeing sales
personnel, managing customer relations, and preparing documents for
100
Burbank’s accountant. When Burbank hired managers, the company
101
distributed a “code of conduct” to the managers within its business.
The “code of conduct” provided guidelines regarding confidential
102
information that it required its managers to follow. More specifically,
Burbank’s “code of conduct” stated that “[n]o . . . employee shall
disclose any confidential or privileged information to any person within
the Company who does not have a need to know or to any outside
individual or organization except as required in the normal course of
103
business.” In general, to maintain its competitive advantage over rival
companies, Burbank sought to identify and protect information that had

94. See Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 792; see also Compuware Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 23212863, at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
95. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 798.
96. WIS. STAT. § 134.90 (2003-04).
97. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d. at 785.
98. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 785-86.
99. Id. at 786.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (alterations in original).
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sufficient economic value such that competitors might have reason to
104
attempt to obtain that information by improper means.
Burbank employees also received an employee handbook providing
that disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information could result
105
in disciplinary action.
The handbook also disclosed that employees
106
may be required to sign a non-disclosure agreement.
Sokolowski
acknowledged in writing that he received and understood the provision
107
regarding the non-disclosure agreement.
In 2001, Sokolowski left Burbank and “signed an employment
108
contract with United Liquid Waste Recycling, Inc. (‘United Liquid’).”
However, before Sokolowski resigned from Burbank, he accessed and
109
took with him confidential information from Burbank’s computers.
Sokolowski took with him a list of Burbank’s grease trap customers,
which included 2,400 names, phone numbers, addresses, “contact
persons, total gallons for each grease trap, and the pricing Burbank had
110
In addition, Sokolowski took a
applied to each customer.”
spreadsheet of Burbank’s industrial clients that showed the amount of
grease collected from each customer, the fee Burbank paid that
customer for the grease, as well as information regarding the amount of
collections and revenues earned for certain Burbank drivers based on
111
their pick-up routes.
This type of confidential information that
Burbank sought to protect provides an excellent illustration of the
confidential information that does not rise to the level of a trade
112
Sokolowski knew that he took this information without
secret.
Burbank’s permission and that Burbank considered all of the
113
information confidential.
104. Id. at 786 n.3; see Unikel, supra note 13, at 844-46. This type of information would
likely primarily include category two and three information. See also discussion supra Part
I.B.
105. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 786.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 786-87.
112. Id.; see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (1979).
The most commonly accepted definition of a trade secret usually includes information
classified as a “formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process.” Id. Though the confidential business information at issue in Burbank could be a
“compilation,” most courts and lay people tend to think of industry or business specific
information as being a trade secret. See Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 786-87.
113. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 787.
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Sokolowski used Burbank’s confidential information to solicit
114
customers for United Liquid. When it became aware of Sokolowski’s
actions, Burbank filed a suit claiming that Sokolowski “misappropriated
Burbank’s trade secrets, breached his duty of loyalty to Burbank,
intentionally interfered with Burbank’s business relationships, and
115
committed computer crimes.” Because both the circuit court and the
court of appeals agreed that Burbank’s confidential information did not
meet the statutory definition of a trade secret, and because the courts
concluded that Wisconsin’s adoption of the UTSA precluded all
common law tort claims based on misappropriation of information
116
deemed not to be a trade secret, the defendant’s motion for summary
117
Burbank appealed the decision and the
judgment was granted.
118
Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review.
In its analysis, the court used the common rules of statutory
construction to determine the legislature’s meaning of Wisconsin
Statute section 134.90(6), which is Wisconsin’s adoption of section seven
119
Burbank did not appeal the fact that the information
of the UTSA.
120
Sokolowski took with him did not qualify as a trade secret.
After
analyzing the legislative history of the statute, court precedent, and
three categories of cases from other states, the Wisconsin Supreme
121
Court held that §134.90 was meant to “leave available all other types
of civil actions that do not depend on information that meets the
122
As a result, the court
statutory definition of a ‘trade secret.’”
overturned the court of appeal’s decision by holding that any civil tort
claim not based on the misappropriation of information deemed to be a
123
trade secret remains available to Burbank.
Thus, the court’s decision gave Burbank another avenue with which
to pursue legal remedies against Sokolowski. The result of this case,
and cases decided similarly under each state’s adoption of the UTSA,

114.
under the
(1979).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. This disclosure of the confidential information constitutes misappropriation
UTSA. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(2)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 787.
See WIS. STAT. § 134.90(6) (2005-06).
Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 787.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id.
See WIS. STAT. § 134.90(6)(a).
Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 793.
Id. at 793-94.
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could have a detrimental effect on employees and their mobility.
Outcomes such as that in Burbank further contribute to the current
confusion of whether the UTSA, as adopted by the states, abrogates all
other tort remedies for the misappropriation of confidential information
that does not rise to the level of trade secret status.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, however, took a different perspective on this issue, holding
that the UTSA does abrogate all other civil remedies for the
124
misappropriation of information deemed not to be a trade secret.
In Compuware Corp. v. International Business Machines, the
defendant, International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”),
125
developed and sold computer hardware, software, and services. “The
plaintiff’s Compuware products at issue in its preliminary injunction
motion were File-AID and Abend-AID,” which were “software tools
that streamlined software applications for IBM’s” computers by
126
“allowing programmers to easily” manage and edit data. Compuware
had a solid reputation in this line of computer software.
“In 1999, IBM developed a program called File Manager to compete
127
with File-AID, and Fault Analyzer to compete with Abend-AID.”
IBM developed these tools at its Australian Programming Centre,
where much of the code for the first version of IBM’s new products was
128
taken from pre-existing IBM programs. Compuware claims that IBM
used former Compuware employees and confidential information
obtained from those former employees to develop the first version of
129
As a result, Compuware sought
IBM’s new competing products.
damages for multiple claims including preliminary injunctive relief to
stop what it described as theft of its proprietary information and trade
130
In its analysis of the case, the U.S. District Court for the
secrets.
Eastern District of Michigan began its discussion of trade secret law by
stating that “to prove misappropriation under the Michigan Uniform
131
Trade Secret Act (“MUTSA”) Compuware must show that (1) it has

124. Compuware Corp. v. IBM Corp., No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 23212863, at *8
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2003).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id. at *1.
131. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1901-1910 (West 2002).
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protectable trade secrets, and (2) that IBM has improperly acquired,
132
disclosed or used those trade secrets.”
Though the court ultimately held that Compuware had not shown
that it would suffer sufficient harm if the preliminary injunction was not
133
granted, the court opined that Michigan’s adoption of the UTSA does,
134
in fact, abrogate all other civil remedies. The court further stated that
the “purpose of the UTSA was to ‘codify all the various common law
tort remedies for theft of ideas’ and that ‘plaintiffs who believe their
135
Thus, by
ideas were pilfered may resort only to the UTSA.’”
broadening the scope of Michigan’s adoption of the UTSA to be the
sole remedy for the misappropriation of any business information that
has some economic value to a company, the court in Compuware took
nearly the opposite position as that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
136
Burbank.
C. Category Three Analysis
The third category of cases necessary to consider when
determining the impact of allowing additional or alternative tort claims
based on the misappropriation of confidential information deemed not
to be a trade secret involve those “claims [that are based] on misuse of
confidential information, some of which meet the statutory definition of
137
a trade secret and some of which do not.”
Several courts in varying
jurisdictions have held “that the UTSA abrogates claims only to the
138
extent that they are based on a trade secret.”
Separate claims based
on other factual allegations—such as the misappropriation of
139
information deemed not to be a trade secret—survive.
One example of such a case is AutoMed Technologies, Inc. v.
140
Eller and Youngs were “high-level” employees with AutoMed
Eller.
Technologies (“AutoMed”), which designed automated medical

132. Compuware, 2003 WL 23212863, at *8.
133. Id. at *10.
134. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1908(1); see also Compuware, 2003 WL 23212863,
at *8.
135. Compuware, 2003 WL 23212863 at *8 (quoting Clearing Niagara, Inc. v. Midwest
Brake Bond Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (W.D. Mich. 2003).
136. See id.; Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 798 (Wis.
2006).
137. Id. at 792-93.
138. Id. at 793.
139. Id.
140. AutoMed Technologies, Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
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dispensing systems.
Eller originally worked for a company that
eventually became Healthcare Corp. (“Baxter”); however, Baxter sold
the business division that Eller worked in, along with “certain
142
intellectual property and trade secret rights, to AutoMed.” The “asset
purchase agreement” that enabled this business transaction also
“assigned Baxter’s rights under any confidentiality and non-compete
agreements with the division’s employees and third party
143
subcontractors.”
Eller continued to work in the same division, despite the fact that
Baxter was sold to AutoMed; and eventually, in 1999, he signed an
144
employment agreement with AutoMed.
However, he never signed
145
the company’s non-competition and non-disclosure agreements.
Youngs, the other employee mentioned in the suit, also signed an
employment agreement with AutoMed. However, he did sign his non146
competition and non-disclosure agreement.
Eller, Youngs, and Sun Design, a subcontractor originally hired to
work with AutoMed, eventually terminated their employment with
147
AutoMed and began working for Express Scripts.
In the course of
their new employment, Eller, Youngs, and Sun Design continued to
148
work on a project they had started while working at AutoMed. Thus,
AutoMed brought a suit against Eller, Youngs, and Sun Design for
misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and breach of
149
fiduciary duty.
In its analysis, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois concluded that some of the information AutoMed alleged the
defendants took did qualify as trade secrets; therefore, the Illinois Trade
150
151
provided the exclusive remedy for those claims.
Secrets Act
However, the court also allowed AutoMed to pursue two breach of
fiduciary duty claims against its former employees because, in their
plotting to leave the company, the employees misused confidential

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 919.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 919-20.
Id. at 920.
Id.
See id. at 919.
See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/1-9 (West 2001).
AutoMed, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
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information not deemed to be a trade secret. Thus, as this case points
out, courts often take the time to scrutinize the type of material claimed
to be a trade secret when determining what types of claims employers
may bring against former employees. This analysis seems to favor the
interests of the employer over the employee because the employees in
this suit were, if found guilty of the alleged claims, subject to multiple
punishments under multiple theories of liability.
III. BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS
“The underlying jurisprudence behind trade secret protection is that
an owner should have a remedy if the essential element of secrecy is lost
due to a breach of confidence by someone obligated to keep [the]
153
Before determining the most appropriate
information secret.”
interpretation of section seven of the UTSA, courts and legislatures
need to consider the public policy implications of the various
interpretations of section seven.
Often, competing businesses,
154
How a
employers, and mobile employees have competing interests.
court interprets section seven of the UTSA may affect businesses,
employers, and employees differently.
In order to maintain a competitive advantage, businesses should be
able to protect confidential information that is valuable to their
business. In many industries, certain confidential information is
155
economically necessary to the viability of a business.
As a result of
the “tremendous economic advantages that exclusive knowledge . . .
affords to companies in highly competitive industries,” there is a great
deal of incentive for competing businesses to acquire that confidential
156
Because the incentives for obtaining confidential
information.
information can be so great, businesses and individuals have used
157
improper means to acquire or use that valuable information.
Thus,
courts and legislatures should interpret the UTSA in a manner that
promotes the policy behind the UTSA, which is to work to “eliminate or
. . . minimize the incentives to obtain competitively valuable information
158
through corrupt practices, rather than through independent effort.”

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See id. at 921-22.
Rustad, supra note 39, at 508.
Unikel, supra note 13, at 845-51.
See id. at 845-46.
Id.
Id.; see cases discussed supra Part II.
Unikel, supra note 13, at 846.
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However, the level of protection afforded to confidential
information needs to be further balanced against the policy of
159
promoting innovation and encouraging invention.
If too much
confidential information is protected, or information that is too widely
known is protected, competitive businesses and industries will be
prevented from using that information to innovate and generating new
160
technological and business advances.
On the contrary, however,
without legal protection for valuable, confidential, independentlydiscovered information, businesses would have little incentive to create
new technology and innovation because there would be no guarantee
161
This outcome
that its discoveries would be protected from theft.
might mean either (1) companies would simply stop trying to innovate,
or (2) companies would invest so much money in protecting their
confidential information that they would have little money left over for
162
the development of new technology.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, courts need to consider the
163
interests of employees, namely, departing employees. In the situation
involving departing employees and trade secrets or confidential
information deemed not to be a trade secret, courts have consistently
164
In
held that there is value in protecting both types of information.
states such as California, departing employees are often involved in
trade secret lawsuits as a result of using certain information obtained
from a former job while subsequently employed by a competing
165
business.
In such cases, businesses seek to hold former employees
liable for using confidential information deemed not to be a trade
secret, and former employers often try to claim damages under a variety
166
This type of litigation, however, can have a
of tort law claims.
negative impact on employee mobility. If employers continue to restrict
the use of confidential information not deemed to be a trade secret by
suing former employees under tort claims for use of information, then
employees might become less likely to take new positions in similar
industries for fear of inevitable litigation. Also, allowing companies to
bring tort claims against departing employees for using confidential
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 846-49.
See id. at 849-50.
Id. at 847-49.
Id.
See Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 9.
See cases discussed supra Part II.
See Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶¶ 9-10; see also cases discussed supra Part II.
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information not deemed to be a trade secret essentially allows
employers the ability to enforce implied post-employment covenants.
This result decreases the incentive for employers to implement
confidentiality agreements while an employee is actually employed, and
leaves an employee with little guidance regarding what information is
acceptable information to take and use in a new position.
Recognizing these dangers, states such as California have used its
Business and Professions Code to explicitly support employee mobility
167
within a given job market.
According to Attorney Tait Graves,
“[f]ederal courts applying California law have also used section 16600
[of the Business and Professions Code] to void restrictive post168
Therefore, when determining whether the
employment covenants.”
UTSA abrogates other tort law claims for suits involving confidential
information deemed not to be a trade secret, courts and legislatures
need to consider the interests of departing employees.
IV. HOW TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION NOT DEEMED
TO BE A TRADE SECRET UNDER THE UTSA
Upon balancing the interests of employers, employees, and
competitive businesses, the most efficient and fair interpretation of the
current version of the UTSA is that it does, or should, abrogate all other
civil remedies for the misappropriation of confidential information
169
deemed not to be a trade secret.
Further, the courts should look
seriously into moving away from the rigid definition of a trade secret
and instead, seek to define information according to the categories set
forth in Part I.B.
If courts adopt this view, they would essentially be holding that: “(1)
the only mechanism available for the protection of . . . [confidential
information] is an action under a state’s trade secret act; and, (2) that
common-law theories pertaining exclusively to the protection of trade
170
secrets or confidential information are . . . preempted [or abrogated].”
This interpretation of the UTSA is more efficient and effective than the
other competing theories. Holding that the UTSA only applies to
information that is “legally” defined as a trade secret or holding that
misappropriation of trade secrets or confidential information can be
protected by any legal theory and ignoring the UTSA all together,
167.
168.
169.
170.

Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 9; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997).
Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 11.
See Unikel, supra note 13, at 886-88.
Id. at 886.
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“reduce[s] the UTSA to just another basis for recovery and leave[s]
171
Essentially, any other interpretation
prior law . . . untouched.”
renders the UTSA mostly ineffective. If courts perpetuate the notion
that the UTSA does not abrogate other tort claims for the misuse of
information not deemed to be a trade secret, the policy behind the
UTSA—to eliminate the uncertainty associated with trade secret
protection—will fall away and the law existing at the outer bounds of
trade secret law will be no more clear today than it was when the UTSA
was enacted.
The interpretation that the UTSA abrogates all other civil tort
remedies for the misuse of confidential information deemed not to be a
trade secret also effectively protects the interests of businesses,
competing businesses, and departing employees.
The interests of businesses seeking to protect confidential
information not deemed to be a trade secret would be given even
stronger protection under this interpretation of the UTSA. In order to
afford companies the greatest degree of protection, it is imperative for
courts to protect both trade secrets and confidential information that
does not rise to the level of a trade secret in a similar manner. Often
times, there is no distinction in the relative value between these types of
172
information to a business.
A chemical formula, for example, may be
just as valuable as confidential customer lists, which may not be a trade
secret. As such, given the importance of such information, the UTSA
should protect confidential information deemed not to be a trade secret
and abrogate other civil tort remedies. This approach allows businesses
to efficiently bring suits under the UTSA for misappropriation of a
variety of types of information. This approach would also, in turn,
reduce litigation costs and eliminate some of the uncertainty
surrounding protection of confidential information. Also, as stated in
the UTSA, contract claims would still be available to businesses in the
event that a departing employee violates a confidentiality or
employment agreement.
Had the court in Burbank affirmed the appeals court’s decision by
holding that the UTSA does protect confidential information, it would
have further effectuated the underlying purpose of the UTSA—that is,
to promote uniformity in this area of law. Instead, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court only added to the confusion that already exists and

171. Unikel, supra note 13, at 888.
172. See supra Part I.B.
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undermined the intent of the drafters of the UTSA to truly create a
173
uniform law among the states.
Further, if courts find that the UTSA abrogates other tort claims for
misappropriation of confidential information deemed not to be a trade
secret, competing businesses will be even less likely to misappropriate
any type of confidential information. This bright line approach would
further minimize the incentive to steal confidential information from
competing businesses because the law would be clear regarding how a
court should handle misappropriation claims. Thus, clarifying the law
would only further discourage competitors from stealing confidential
information.
Finally, though the idea may be counterintuitive, holding that the
UTSA does abrogate all other tort remedies for the misuse of
confidential information deemed not to be a trade secret does effectuate
the best interests of departing employees. By holding that the UTSA
does not abrogate alternative tort actions for misappropriation of
174
information that is deemed “confidential but not a trade secret,”
employers are able to hold former employees liable for using
information not deemed to be a trade secret under a variety of legal
175
theories. This tactic on the part of former employers seems to “us[e]
tort law to create an implied non[-]competition contract with the
176
As a result, employees are vulnerable to
departing employee.”
multiple claims with unknown outcomes.
By eliminating the
ambiguities associated with the UTSA, courts can give departing
employees a body of law that clarifies what it is that a departing
employee can and cannot do with respect to confidential information
that does not rise to the level of a trade secret. This would also limit the
damages that a court could award to those claims allowed under the
UTSA. Because this outcome may limit the damages an employer could
receive, employers might be more likely to implement employee
confidentiality agreements to avoid litigation.
By clarifying this information, employees such as Sokolowski in
Burbank would at least be more likely to know the consequences of
173. See Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 794, 799-803
(Wis. 2006) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
174. Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 10.
175. Id. Relief can be sought by an employer under theories such as breach of
contract, interference with contractual relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair
competition, to name a few. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 890. See also Graves, supra note 8,
¶¶ 46-54.
176. Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 10.
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misusing information. Clarifying the law with respect to employee
liability for misuse of confidential information will presumably make it
easier to educate departing employees about their responsibilities as a
departing employee. As a result, employees will be less likely to be
hesitant to leave a job and will continue to remain mobile in the market,
therefore, perpetuating the public policy supporting employee mobility.
CONCLUSION
At this juncture, perhaps the NCCUSL should be prompted to make
additional amendments, that either (1) explicitly interpret the meaning
of section seven of the UTSA as it is currently drafted, or (2) add
provisions to the UTSA that define confidential information deemed
not to be a trade secret. If the Commission does not make these
suggested changes, then the necessary changes and clarifications will be
up to the state legislatures. However, legislatures may never implement
these changes. Therefore, it is up to the respective state courts to keep
in mind the policies underlying the UTSA’s enactment, as well as the
interests of those businesses and employees who are relying on the
courts to provide cost-effective and predictable remedies for those
businesses whose confidential information is misappropriated. By
holding that the UTSA does abrogate all other civil remedies for
information deemed not to be a trade secret, courts have the ability to
provide much needed stability to the current body of trade secret law.
JULIE PIPER *

* The author received a B.S. degree in 2003 from the University of Notre Dame and is a 2008
J.D. candidate at Marquette University Law School, where she is an associate editor of the
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review. She would like to thank her family, for its
support, and the editors and staff of the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review for their
assistance in publishing this Comment.

